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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\\' f1;8T Ji~RX K\,.G L\,.EEH8, lXC., 
--J1;rnVAHD8 "\XJ) Kl<~LCF~Y, 
[>/aintiffs anr1 AJ!J!el!ants, 
-\·s.-
~TA'l' 11~ OF 1 ''l'A II, ])~- aml 
Thro11gli Its ROAD CO?\DIISSION, 
!Jf' fr 1u1 (lid 1111 rl Res /!IJJ/11 en f. 
Case 
No. 10919 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
TO TII 11~ HOXOHABLE CHIEF .JUSTICE AND 
.\SSO( 'L\ TE .JP~TTCES OF THIS COURT: 
STATE?\fEi\T OF NATURE OF CASJ<~ 
Tlw a ppe lla 11 ts, joint ,-entnrers, brought suit for 
dnm;i gps a gains t res porn lent for extras and for breach 
of ;111 '' "\gn•eme11 t for E11gi1weri11g Se1Tices, '' occa-
:;io11v<1 h~· n•sJ)(lrnll'nt 's dC'lays arnl hindrances during 
tli1· JH•rforma11cp of the contract. 
l>ISPOSlTlOX IX THE Lff\Yl<~R COFRT 
.\1'11·r pl11i11tiff mu1 defr1111m1t stipulate<l all(l settled 
11l:1i11tiff's «l;1im !'or <•:dras, tliP Distrid Court of Snit 
1 
Lake County granteo defendant's ~1 otiou for Snmman 
Judgment and dismissed plaintiff\; action on the m0rih 
on the two remaining issues of Dela~' arnl Interest 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to vacate the summary judg-ment 
below and seeks an order granting plaintiffs a trial 0 11 
the remaining factual issues involYed h0rei11. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 13, 1957, a Joint Venture, consisting-
of Western Engineers, Inc., a Utah Corporation, arnl 
Edwards and Kelcey, a partnership of Newark, :New 
.Jersey, hereinafter called appellants, ~rnhmitted a pro-
posal for engineering services to the State Road Com-
mission of Utah, hereinafter called the respondent. The 
~erYices proposed to be performed by the plaintiffs in-
cluded surveys, preliminary designs, final designs, prepa-
ration of plans and specifications, and apprornl of shop 
drawings for approximately 18.6 miles of the Interstate 
Highway System from North L0hi to South Provo, in 
the State of Utah. The proposal of the app0llants C'Oll-
tained the following: 
"We will complete all contract. plans arnl spe('i-
fications within nine months after notice to pro-
ceed, provided that there is not more than a _fll'O 
weeks interval between submission of the vanous 
phases of design to the Commission and approval 
of the above designs by the Commission awl the 
Bureau of Public Roads. 
2 
'rhe written agreement later executed by the parties 
provid0cl: Item V-8. 5: 
"Total time for eomplPtion of contract - nme 
months aft0r notice to fJl'Oe0ed except for check-
ing of shop rlrawings ... '' 
and Tt0m TY-P. Duties of the Road Commission: 
"To ,gffe thorongh consideration of all 
sketehes, estimates, working drawings, specifica-
tions, proposals, and other documents laid before 
it h>· the 0Co11sulting Engineer, and to inform the 
Co11sn1ti11g- Engi1wer of its decisions within a rea-
srnwNr time sn as not tn interrupt or delay the 
U"ork ol flip rnnsultinp En.Qincer." (Emphasis 
aclcled) 
An important third party, the United States Bu-
renn of Puhlic Roads, was indirectly involved in the con-
tract. ftem T-e of the contract provides: 
"This projeet is part of the Federal Aid Sys-
t0m and as surh, it is understood that the plans 
and drsi.rn1s must lw approw•d by the Bureau of 
Puhlir Ron<ls in aecordance with the usual pro-
cedure. The Consulting Engineer will cooperate 
with the Bnreau of Pnhlic Roads, at all tim0s 
through the Hoad Commission, and will furnish 
such data, 0stimates, plans, break down of quan-
titi0s, Ptc., ns mn>· he reciuired from time to time 
ll\· thP Bnrenn of Public Roacls which will trans-
n~it snch requests through the Road Commission." 
(Emphasis added) 
'rltl' ,nittc•n ag-reement prm·iding for performance 
of sai<l e11gi11eering serYicrs h>· thP appellant was executed 
as of "F\•bruai·y 21, 10.)8, awl th<' agTL'<'rne11t ,,·as app1·o\·('i1 
by the Office of the ~.\.ttornl',\' 0<'1lera1 of t!H' Statp <1f 
Utah. 
Although the a1)pel1ant ha<l eommP11ct>d :-;ome o!' tl1t' 
work to he performe<l, n'rhal 110ticP to pr<l<'P<'d ""1, 
aetually given by thP respondL'11t on Vi.'llrnar:-· :1, 1!l:->8, and 
c011firmet1 by letter of February .\ 10.)fl. Sin<'<' 1 IH· <'11Ji 
tract was to lw eomplefrll \\·itlii11 nilll' rnollih:-;, 1111· d:lt1· 
for completion of till' P11~irn_'l'ri11g sen·i<'<':-; wa:-; :\ o\·1·rn-
her 3, 19:18. 
It was contemplate<l and was tlie i1i1Pllti()n nf hotl1 
parties to perform thL' engi1wNing work as rnpirll:-· <1' 
possihl0 in order that eonstrudio11 f'Ontrads co11l1l hu 
let at the earliest possil1l0 <lat<> to takP ;11h-allt:1g1• of 
federal fnnds m·ailahle for such purpose, and tlie partie' 
<·011t<>mplated that sneh fnml:-; wonl<l ]ip <Wai1<1hl .. :11111 
the contract recikd that snfficil'lli fnrnls had lwr•11 ln1d!.! 
etcd for the project. For man:- cansPs, inC"1111lirn.:- tl11· 
1aek of a\·ailahl<> funds, and for reas<rns Jip~-01111 th<' ('on-
trol of am1e l1m1t, the scope of t Ii P prnj!'d an '1 t I It' 1 i1w 
sche<lnl<> for completion ·was ehmi_~<'<l. 'rhl' C>J1~i11<'1•ri1w 
,,-ork original]~- sehodnled to he fi.11ish<><l within ri wriod 
of nine months t'ventna11y strdeh<'<l out on>r a lH·riod 11f 
about 31~ years, which delay aprwllant eo11frncls wns d1w 
to breach of contraet h~- tho r<>spornlent i11 m1n•as011:1l1h· 
and arbitrarily flelaying the work of t11e appPlla11t. 
During the 31/:!-year periocl a llllmh<>r of f'011trnn1· 
si<>s den,1opec1 between tlH' appf'llm1t arnl tli<' n•spo11d1·1tt 
4 
wit 11 J'('Sf H'd to extra work arn1 rha11gPs in tl1t• sropr of 
1 li<' senic·e>s to hp rern1Pred and the attPrnlant <lela:· 
(';rns<><1 to th<' appc•11ant. Jn (•onnection with at least som0 
111' tl1osr contn>v0rsiPs ilIYolving extras, the responde11t 
;1u_'J'('('d apw•llant w:is cntitle<l to and respondent paid 
r·xt rn <'ompensa tion. IT(\\\·evcr, upon completion of the 
c·11u.·i11<·Pri111..!· s<·ni<'PS, tlw parties fonnd it impossihle to 
n ·;1<'l1 n 11 :wn ·e<1 hl c· sf'tt1 rmr•nt on C'crtai11 i te>ms an cl after 
,;1•\'(•rnl m(•dings of all ronrrrned, inrlncling the Bureau 
r1t' P11hli<' Roads. it was agreed to suhmit these remain-
i11~ itr•ms to nrliitration. The arhitration hoard \\'as 
1·ompose<l of tl1rcr' comp0t(•nt engineers, one selC'cted hy 
;1ppr•llm1t, 011<' Ji~· r<'spornknt, arn1 the third by the two 
't·l,·r·t,·d C1rhitrators . 
. \ ftC'r the ]waring, a unammous award to the appel-
L111t \\ ns ma<lP Ji~- the Roa rel of Arbitration, for rer-
1;ii11 <·xt r:is mid inrlnc1e(1 an itC'm of $76,000.00 for 
,J..Ja:·. pins 1,•gal i11t<•rrst. 1'lw ~tate of Ptah h:ts honored 
;111d pa id tl1r l'Xtras rnnudPd, lint has repndiatC'd the 
~lfi,000.00 ;1\\'<1nlf•<l for rlrla:- nndC'r arhitration aml has 
:1].;:n rPp11tli;1h-11 tl11• elaime<l intrrest due under the arhi-
trntin11 pr11c·<•er1ing (R. :11 ). 
l1Pm TX-tl. of the ngTc•c•mrnt, part of the general con-
dit io11s, pro\·idl's as fol1m\·s: 
''The Consnltiw!· Engim•rr ag-rre~ to prot<e-
<·nk t li0 work eontinuonsl:- am1 rliligentl~-. and 
t11af 11u 1-7111n/!'s ur doi111s for damages will be 
11uflll' 7,1/ fli!'11; (ur 1111.11 rlrla11 or hillrlrrrnrrs, of any 
1·a11se 1rl1afs11erer, d11ri11.r1 the /)l'o,r;ress of any 7JOr-
l i1111 11( seri·i11's s;!l'1·it'i1·11 111 tl1is a,r1n'e111c1d. ~nrli 
,) 
delays or hindrances, if any, lihall be eompP11sah·il 
for by an extension of time• for s11d1 reasrma/1/r 
periods that the Road C'on11n ission 111ay rlffir!I'." 
(Emphasis added) 
Although the services to be performed by the appel-
lant were to be accomplished within 11ine months from 
i10tice to proceed, that is, by the 3rd <lay of :._i onmlH'r, 
1958, the work was in fact not complPted u11til Odohl·r 
of 1961. Appellant claims that the :3%-yPar dela)· wa:-< 
due to the arbitrary and unreasonable dPlay impoRrd 
upon the appellant by the respondent's breach of ib 
agTeement to adYise the appt>llant of its deeisions with 
regard to submissions by the appellant withi11 a n•aso11-
able time. Appellant further claims that surh decision~ 
were delayed for unreasonable periods of time for rea-
sons not contemplated by the parties at the time the 
contract was negotiated and exeruted. In addition, apprl-
lant claims that the unreasonable delays in seeuri11g elPar 
ances for structures oYer railroads, eonstituting 011P-
third of the entire project, \Vere not routemplated hy th1· 
parties. 
Finally, appellant suggests the n•al rPason for tlw 
State's refusal to accept the arbitration a\rnrd \\'itli re-
spect to delay is that tlw Unite<l Rtates Burpau of I'uli-
lic Roads has not agreed in a<france to parti<·ipate if 
payment is made hy the State. 
6 
;\ RGU1\fENT 
POINT I 
TJH~ COlTRrl' ERRED IN GRANTING DE-
P' f<~l\'"D~\~T'S .'.\fOTTON FOR SlBIMARY JUDG-
:\fK~\'T AND DJ THS:\IISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
<'LA lM F'OR D.\ :\f A(H~S. 
Tltt> (·a:-:es ar0 legion whieh hol<l summary judgment 
IS prnpPrl~· C'ntered 01d)· wlwn there exists no genni1w 
i:..:.'-'lH' of a matNial faet to lw tried. l\lr .. Justire ·wade, 
,;pPaki 11g for th0 Court in Tanner , .. Utah Poultry & 
F11r1111Ts ('1Jnperatin', 11 P. 2cl 353, 355 (1961), states, 
'·. \ s11 mmn r:< .i 11dgmPnt is appropriate onl!T where the 
fonln•d party makPs a showing which precludes, as a 
mat1Pr of law, tlw ;nrnnling of an~· relid to the losing 
part:·." 
I JI passing 011 the proper effect to he afforded the 
sn-<'nlh•<l "110 damagP" clause in construction contracts, 
<·0111"ts lian eJ11111ciat<•d tlw following general principle: 
WII<•n• t!H•n• is n qm•stion of whether the exculpaton· 
<·1n11sp \ms internl0d b~· the pariies to prevent recovery 
nnder the parti('n]ar eirrumstm1ces, the qnestion in-
rnh·1·s <1<'ierminntio11 of factual issues which must lw 
(;tJ'(•fnll~· wPiglw<1 h~· the trier of fact. The reason for 
tlIP rulP i." that in light of thP unexpected the "no darn-
w.;e" (']ans<' lweornes arnbiguons and therefore must he 
i111 ('J']ll'Ph•d i11 \'it>w of whnt the parties :rnticipatecl which 
i" a 1 111,.:..:tion of fact for the• jnr>·· Hawlry v. Oran.r1e 
f'111111t11 F!11011 ('1J11trul District. '.27 Cal. Rptr. 478, 484 
i l!lfi:i), is ill11:..:1ratin. Tl1Pl'l' tlIP plai11tiff hronght f'nit 
i' 11r d.rn1<1!!l's agilin:..:1 tlH• pnhli<' authority for its lmr0a-
~1111:ilil« tl1·lny i1I prn,·iding l1im "·itlI n·,·i:owc1 plnn:..: for 
the coustruction of ecrtain manlwles. 'rht• lowc•r <·ouri 
had gnrntcd summary judgmt'nt for thl' defrndallt <11id 
the California District Court of A PJH'al, in n•\·ersi11;.;, 
stated: "The question of whether or not the dela>· dam-
age clause ·was iutcrnled by the J>artiPs to pn•\'('lll l'l'-
covery under the particular circumstarn·es hen_• illn>h (•d 
resoh·es itself into a factual question reqni ri11~ t Jip 
weighting of all tlie facts ]HesP11ted. '' 
Similarly, in A1gcr11011, Blair, l11c. v. "\'urfulk ffr-
derelnvment & llnusing A11f/i()rity, 200 Vn. 81.), 108 ~.K 
2d 259 (1059), the Suprem<' Court of Vir1 . ;inia n•\"<'l'"l'd 
summary juclgmc•nt for the defe11<lnnt. Plaintiff liro1H(\1t 
an action for clamages arising 0111 of t 11<' dPfo11dnni 's 
stop order prnding innstigation of 1H•ating s>-stpms 
bring installed in certain home's hy th<' plaintiff. lk-
fendant answered that under tht• tl'rms of tl1e <·cmtrnd, 
the delay <lamage clause negated plaintiff's 1·];1im for 
damag<>s. The court notNl that n jury should lrn H l1<>t•11 
1wnnitted to ascrrtai11 \\"hether the prndieal c·cn1,.;t l'lll'-
tion placed by the litigants on th(• "110 <lamagp" ('la11~c· 
contemplated the situation where thP pnhlie autl1ority 
issued a stop order. Accord: Ace ,','follt, Tllr·. \". lT'a.11111 
To11"11sl1izJ, 221 A. 2cl 515 (1966). 
Jn the instant case, app<•1lants belie\·e tl10 qne~ti~•ll 
of whether cumulativr hindranre and <klay nppn1xi-
mating three am1 one-half yl•arl'.' was int<'rnl<•d llY t 111' 
parties to fall within the seope of tlie "110 damaµ:P" 11rn-
\·ision of th(• eontraet is a factual one im-oh·ing dd<·nni-
nations \Yhich eau only he fairl>- eon<'ln<lc•d h>· \\'l'i~d1i11.'!' 
all the eYidence. Can it be said, as a mattc>r of l:n1 n11d 
without any SC'l'utin)' of the facts nrnl circnmstanet's ,.;11r-
r11rn1di11g· 11H· partic•s rontractnal 1iegotiations, the liti-
,!.(a11ts (•ontemplatell that an extension of time would coll-
~·t it 111 l' t lir so]p remcd~v mH1er the rontract, even thongh 
1111· ~tat1• ohstrurtr<l n11d prorrastinated romplPtion of 
t lie' Pll!.(inerring s<·n·iet•s for over three years and as a 
r1•s11lt. spreiall)· rrcrnited <•11gim•ers and other sperialists 
n·mai110d idll' nr llt>nrl_\- idle at grrat expensr to the 
ap]H•llm1t. 
ft is rrspN·tfull>· sul>mittecl the parti0s did not con-
tt·mplHte :1 1 ~ ~-c·ars eumulati,-c delny and that then•forc 
t 111• ''no <lamng<•'' elmrne is amhignous and appellant is 
1·11tit ]1•d to a lie;ning oil the factual matters eontainecl 
lwn•i11. 
POINT TI 
TrTE Lff\YF:R ( 'OFRT ERRED IN RULING 
TTL\ T .\ PPELL.AXTS ·wERE PRECLUDED 
T<'THD! HECOYERY P:t\DEH THE "NO Dk~f­
.\OT•:" <'L~\rSE. 
Tl1e general r11!0 for ronstrnetin11 of pnhlie con-
trnds is stated in --i'.l Am .. Tnr., I'111Jlic TYorks a}/(1 C'rm-
fmrts. ~ection 8.+: 
"Ex('ept a" tl1<' antl1nrit:- of pnhlic n!.(ents nncl 
tl10 linliility of public hotlies are limited hy statute, 
tlir ri!.dits nrnl reme<li<'s of parties to a public con-
trnd ;1n·, in ~·rn<'rnl, go\·erne1l h:· thr same prin-
ciples ns those• whieh appl:· to pri\·ate contrncts. 
TlH• ()hli.~·atio11 to do .instiee rests as well upon 
p111ilic bodies n" upon irnliYidna1s genernllr." 
Tl111s, <l ppr,;oll \\·ho snstains damages dne to the 
L:ilill'l' of n nart:· to prrform within the preserihecl time' 
i~ 1•11titled to damages. Tl'i!lisfrm. C'o11tracfs, R1,,·isecl 
l·~d.,, ,. (i~l~l. 'TliP rnl<' is eq1w1ly applicable to pnlilie Locl-
''"";. TJ 111 s, .i:i ,\m . .Tnr., fl11l1lic Trorks a11r1 Co11fra('fs. 
~ lH, 11nt(•s: 
"It is ge11erall>' coneedc•d that a c011trador 
for public work may, in proper eaReR, recovpr dam-
ages for dela>· in the completio11 of the "·ork, for 
the execution nf the contract, for which <lclay the 
p11 l1lie authoritirs <H<' n•sponsihle, as where dam-
ages nre oecasi01wcl h>· reason of cleln>· of the gov-
ernment in furnishing thr eontrador with pl1111c< 
or materials reqnirrd under the contract, or in 
designating the site for tlw work. The rnk• is fr(•-
quently applit•d in caRes of eontraetorn for F<'<1-
eral work or for supplies for thr Fc•deral Oo\·-
er11ment.'' 
vVilliston, Contra('fs, Revisrd Ed., Vol. !l, lV n r ('1111-
tract ('[aims,~ 209, notes: 
''A governmrnt contractor is L•ntitled to recO\·er 
cln.mages for actual losR sustained through dela>· 
hy the Government in furnishing necessary data 
from it for the prosecution of the work, failurr to 
make available the site, ek .... D('cision that ap-
propriatirms are 11ot arnilable, h>· Comptrol10r 
General, constituteR de la~· by G0Hrnmf'11t." (Em-
phasis added) 
That the contractor may recon•r for damage:-; rl' 
sulting from delay by a government agency is well n•c·-
ognized even where the contract provides for an extC'11-
sion of time with respect to such delays. Thus in e11arles 
8mith and Sons Construction Cmnpany, lnc. v. State, 
266 App. Div. 886, 42 N.Y. S. 2d 814 (1943) although 
there was not a "no damage" clause the plai11tiff \\"H1' 
allowed a recovery against the State because of dcla:· 
caused by the State which required plaiHtiff to (•ondll('! 
its operations in a segregated and piecemeal mam1Pr 
thereby increasing its costs of 1wrfonnnncc. 
10 
,\);ain i11 ,411fho11y P. Miller, Tnr. v. f!nifed States, 
1 1 F. 8upp. 209, the plaintiff was allowe>d recovery in 
a case \Yhcn• there> was not a "no damage" clause. The 
statement of the Court in the Miller case is irnitructiv<' 
a11d ma~- nppl~· with some force> in thiR matter. At page> 
'.2:10 the Conrt said \\'ith re>Rpect to delay by the govern-
mP11t in (kci<ling whether to build the> buildings accon1-
i11g to plans incorporated in the contract or to change 
those plans snlistantia]]~', that: 
''"Te lHffe fonnrl that the plaintiff's progress 
011 tllf' .ioh <is fl \\·hnle \\'as (lt>la~'C'd 50 cla~·s by this 
1111cPrtaint~·. Tn thr r-irr11mstan('('s, the> govern-
nwnt 's comlnct was a hreach of contract. It had, 
in tlw f'ontract, rC'SC'n-ccl the> right to makC' 
<'l1ang<"'· 1111t o sensihlP rParlinq of that pro1.•isio11 
rlMs 110+ qi1·1· it fh,, ri,Qhf tn delibPrate. in disrP-
oarrl of fhl' i11fprcsts of thP other party to the 
rn11fra('f, for as lonq as it JJll'ases, upon changes 
sn f1111rlamental that thP work ran qo forward 
1111111 haltinrJl11 a11rl 1111cr·mwmimlly until the delib-
err!f in11s ar(' •1:11d111ll'd." (Emphasis added) 
8eC' also ne11r9e ,1. F111ler rmn pany Y. [Tniterl ,C.'fafes. 
10+ Ct. Cl. 17G: Hancoorl-Nebcl ronstrur·tion, Inc. Y. 
T'11ifer1 ,\'fates, 10.> Ct. CL, llfi. Although the Harwood-
XPlH·l cast· lackC'd "110 (lamage" clause the ease is 
'!nncl nnthoritY for the> proposition that a dela~· of 213 
di!Yc; ic; mirPnc;miahle. Also for general authority of the 
ri~.d1t nf ;1 r•nJ1trnctor to recoyrr from the govC'rnmC'nt for 
i!Pla~·c; SI'(' Pl/llelliY Rrirl_(ff' ro111 JJ011.1/ "· [711ifPd Stafrs. 8:) 
( '1. ('l., G0:1 ;111cl Tlirsrlt '"· {'11ite11 8faf('s, 94 Ct. Cl. fi0'.2. 
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Tl1rer earl:· l'11itPd State·" S111J1"1 rn1· < '1111rt r-;1,1·,., a 1 ,. 
frequc·111l:· ('ited as autliorit:· for tl1u prop1>.--iti1111 tliat 
damages to contractor ('au"1·d li:· t 111· !.!">\·1·n1rn1·1it ·, 111·. 
lay callnot lw (·ornpe11sate11. Tlws<· <ll'1• TT. F. r·,, ,,/,. r·,,1 11 . 
pa11y \. ['niter! ,C,'tnte .... ·, :210 CS. +, /() L. Ed. -t-:l.'1 I 1 q~1;); 
l'uiterl States Y. Ri1 I. :.n1 r.s. lil, 81 L. Ed .. ):l (\])(] F11!1 I/ 
\'. T'nitcd States, :t~~l r.s. IJ.±, !ll L. Ed. ++. TJi.· r 'r,,,,/. 
RiC'c anrl Foley ca"c'" are not n«tll~· i11 p11i11t J'"r t 111· 11·,1 
"011 iliat 1lie "pecific (kla:·" \d1ieli 1w1·11n1·d \\ 1·1«· 1·1111 
template<l li:· the partic·s and pro\·iilvd for i11 tl11· <·1111-
trncts nmler snit. As tl11 l11f1 r 111s1, 71111, 1 11i11f· 11 .. 1! !: . 
IJl!Psfion of 1Cliat 1u18111uf1 11111lof1·1l 1111 fJ,,. 11111i11 ·' nt 1/,. 
timr of Cl'ec1di1!}1 ut tl11· 1·111tfn:1 t i11 11·11 ,fi·.11 i, ,,7 , 1 
cal 'moment. 
~\lso in the F11le1; cnsP tl11·1·c· .Jud'!<"- di,.,. .. 11tPd from 
t11e mn.iority opiniou and 110tc·d tlrnt il1<· ~111ti1·1· \11 1111 1 -
(·i'hl ~i·n,n to the co11tractnr li:· tlic· ~0Y•'l'llrn1·11! "<1n;1 ·1 
''ith it an implied prnrni-.;e to lrn\·<, tli .. <·1111..c1~·i 1 r·1: .. 1 -i 
rearly nn<l an ohlil.(ati(Jn nf tl1l' 1·1111t1'<1t·l11r '.11 · 11'.'.1:1 -.. 
the e011traet in 1~0 lla:--·;.; n·11nin·-- tl: .. '.f1"·"n11~11·:11 i111' t•' 
canse rkln:· h~- failnrC' to han• tJi,. "it<· n·a1h f11r <·1·11-
::;trnctio11, irrl'spel'tin• of tlir ~o.'.«111.J Liitli 111' ti 1' 1 .. ' ''' 1·111-
rnrnt. Tl:P po . ;:ition of tlie lli,"1·11~ ;,1'..'.' .1111~c..·1,, i·: 11,. . • :~,,;, '/ 
ease has lie<'lt <H1opt"<1 l1y later r1< 1C'i'i(l11, i11 \\ :1i,.:1 11. 1 • 1 • 
was heforP the l 'onrt a "110 <bm:1'.!<' .. «1'1n'<'. 
~\lthoug-h not i1ffnh·i11~ <1 ··110 dnrn<t!.!'1'·· ,.J,111"''' 
Keli111 ('n1'}111rufiu11 Y. ['11if1'11 Stat1.'. ~1:1 F. ~111111. 1i:21 1• \\ :1-; 
a ens!' wl1il'li di"tingni:·du•d th<' F1·l• 11 c:1s<· <l" 1ll11· i11 "l1i1·l1 
clrb~· wac.; co11tPrnplat1'1l h~· tlie i1nrti<·"· 111 tl11• n.-, / ,,, 1·>1 • 
the plnintiff vontral'\ed to t'nn1i--li ~~\H) 1·1lJllT•·l1· :1r:t 1 ti. 1· 
h<'rnl1-: ;rn<l tl1(• gO\'('l'llIDt>nt "·as required to snppl~· tail 
n:-:sf•mhli<•:-: for tlic homhs. The plaiutiff was delayed in 
p<•rforming it-: cmitrad l10cause> of failurr of the goY-
<•rnrn<•nt to tim0l~· fnrnisl1 tli0 tail asse>mhlies arnl h>-
failure to ne<"<•pt thr homl1s ns the>· \\·ere completed . 
.. :\ 11 int<·rl'sting hackgronrnl sihrntion, in a wa>- simi-
];ir j() tl1P in.-:tant casr>, is 11otrc1 at page> G23 of the report 
as follows: 
'' D0!1i]l(l tlie> <1df•nd;'11t 's flrla>·s in accepting 
11H• hornh-: was tl1P fact tliat the :t\a\·y had lost in-
t('n•:-:t i11 tl1f• co11erPt0 homh program. It was hav-
iw; dif1ie11lt~· in firnlin~ storn'.!"0 space for these 
11m\· 11mnrntPfl ite>ms. RPcanse of the uncertainty 
r·r0nU•d h\· th<' defrrnlmit 's eonfnsing- (leli\·ery of 
prn<·ticP rntlH'r tl1m1 Sl'r\·ire tails and hecause of 
<],·frrnlnnt 's rl(']a~- in snppl>·ing an>- tails ancl in 
;i<·<·<·pting tliP complPkd homhs, plaintiff's per-
formaneP of its eontraet wns rlela>·ecl until April 
1 ~. 1!1-t-L" 
Tit<• K,,/1111 ror;1nrafin11 casr> was distinguished from 
tli<• Fof ey en:-:e ess(•11tiall:· 011 the basis of what was con-
t<•mplat<'<l and ankipate<l h:- the parties and the Court 
at JHH(l' ()~-t a-: follows: 
'' F'urtherrnore>, Fole:· and the government con-
tr;wtt•d i11 :rn ntmosphc•re pregnant with the pos-
:-:ihilitY of <lelaY: h11th knt>\\" that the lighting s:·s-
t(•m c~n1lcl lw i;JStall<'(l onlv after the airport site 
liacl hl•e>11 dreclgPd up fro~ imdC'r watPr, allowPcl 
tn :-:<'ttlr, and ;1,Ta(kll." 
.\nil in tl1i-: eo1111Pdion the• Court sai<l at page G2-1 
:1- f1lJ]o\\'S: 
"The parties confem1;lated that the tailf1 
would be delivrred in sufficient time for plain-
tiff to complete the contraet within 45 da~·s ... 
There was nothing on the faee of the eontraet, 
nothing implicit in the situation, to suggest to 
plaintiff that it should have taken into considera-
tion in setting the price the possibility that pt'l'-
formance would be dela.v-ed hy the governmc11t. '' 
(Emphasis added) 
With respect to extensions of time in comH'dion with 
delays the Court in the Kehm matter hrl<l at ]W~e 6~-1-
as follows: 
"Neither the defendant's ohligation nor its li;i-
bility for its breach is diminished by the fact that 
the contract provided for an rxtension of the time 
for performance in the P\'ent of government im-
posed delays.'' 
And further at page 625 as follows: 
"It has many times hern held that the pron-
sion for an extension of time uo<'s i10t exclnfle tl11· 
possibility that delay ma~· constitute a 1H'0ach for 
which damages may he had." (Citing numerous 
cases and 115 ALR 65) 
Even in cases where there is a so-eal10d ''no <lam-
age" rlanse it has been recognized for many yt>ars thnt 
recovery may nevertheless hr had under ccrtai11 ci rc·nm-
stances. Thus is 10 ALR 2d, page 804, it is notr<l: 
"However, even though a partirular delay may 
fall within the literal terms of what may hf' clrnr-
acterized as a 'no damage' provision, sneh pro-
vision may not be enforced if the tlelay is th1· 
result of fraud or aetive interferc11el' 011 the part 
of the one seeking the lwm•fit of the provisio11. 
And a similar result may oecnr whNe the dPlay 
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is 11ruf roded to an 1111reaso11abl(' lrm.qth." (Em-
plrnsis acl(led) 
Olle of the \'en· first cases to adopt the principle that 
n ''no damage'' da use would not prerlmle rero,·ery for 
drla!' protracted to an unreasonable length was John T. 
Hmrly & rn., ,._ Board at' Education of Sr:hool District 
o( ('ity of New York, 222 App. Div. 504, 226 N.Y. S. 
707 (1928). Tn the Brady case the plaintiff sued for nn-
rPasom1 hle de la~· of the tlefenclant ill remm·ing structures 
from the C'onstrnction site. Tl1e pertinent clanse of the 
('ontrnct was: 
"Tf the \rnrk he <lefa~'ed hy any act or omis-
sion of the Cit~· or the Board, or for the reason 
that the Cit~· or the Board do0s not own, or has 
!/of nldai11Pd pnssPssinn of, or the riqht to enter 
1111n11, the la11r1 11;1on 1rhfrh thr work is to be per-
fnrmrd, or hC'rause of any act or omission of any 
e>mplo~·C'0 or agent of the City or of the Board ... 
tlw Board shall then Pxtencl the time for comple-
tion of thP work for such period as the superin-
te11<1ent slwll <·rrtify that the work has been de-
ln~·e><l. No allowa11cr 11 1liafel'er, as darnaprs or 
ufh('rwise, shall l1r clairnrd by or rna.de to thP 
r·mdrar'fnr lieca11se of a11.11 such df'lays." (Empha-
sis rHldrd) 
The contract m the Brady case to huilr1 a pnhlie 
l'<'liool wns )(,t on August 13, 1923, and required com-
pletion in 3;)0 da~·s. Thr contractor could not proceed 
to eornpletion of the work nntil existing buildings on thr 
:-;if<• \H'l"t' rrmond, whi('h was not fnll~· accomplish?d 
11 ll ti l A Ut!llS t I, 1 !124, 011P ~·par after con st rnction \\'a.-; 
('OJ1lTll\'llC'l'd h~· th0 plaintiff eontrnetor. Tlir ronrt held 
;It Jl<l~<' 70!1 of thP !'\. Y. ReportPr that the nhon 
lfi 
clause gaYe the Rtate no immunity from damagPs for 
delay snfficiPntly unn'asow1hle to "strike at thP h0art of 
the contract and justify thP co11tnidor i11 abandoning 
it," and cited ·with appro\·al, J>eo1;le, r·r rel., Trelfs & 
N ewto11 Company of New York v. Craig, 1:)3 N.E. -H9 
(1921). 
In Peoµle Y. Craig, cited ahovc', th0 "no damagl·'' 
clause provided as follows: 
''If the work he delayed by any action or omis-
sion of the City * ·• * or a11y ad or omissioH of 
any contractor to pNform his work for thL' Cit,., 
a Committee on Buildings, or wlWL'Hl' is dired(:,1 
by this contract to make the errtificatr in rd'l'l'-
enC'e to time, shall then exte1Hl the time for the 
completion of the work for such period as t hP en-
gineer in eharge shall ('(•rtify that the work lias 
been delayed. No all01n111cc 11'1111fc1·r·r as 1la111artr·s 
or ot71enrise sliall be claimed lJ,lf or 111a1le f11 1!11' 
contractor bffa11se of any s11d1 rlclays. • ._, * (Em-
phasis added) 
In interpreting the application of thL' aho\·<' quotPd 
"no damage" clause the Court at page 4-2;) of t1w ~.K 
Reporter states as follows: 
''\Ve are asked to clL•termine that u11dl'r t·lansP 
.T of tlH.' contract tlw eommittee on 1mil1lirn.(s of 
tliP hoarcl of education hy reason of defaults uf 
eo11struction contractors, was authoriz('(l to c>X-
tC'rnl the time of relator to complde its l'011trnd 
(not by reason of act or solicitation 011 t11(• \Hl rt 
of re la tor who was ready and willing to eomp!Ptt• 
its contract within the time preserihed t liPn'i11. 
120 days from October 25, 191;), hut lweam;c> of 
<lcfaults of otl1cr ro11traetors ,,~itli the lloartl ot' 
Pdueation ), said exte11sion eovNing a period uf 
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tlm•(' years, during- which time relator woul(l con-
tim1<> l>ound h>· the tc•rms of the contract, while 
honrcl of e<lucation wonld not be liable to relator 
for an>· (lamagr causecl it h~v such delay, neither 
\\onlcl n•l<ltor 11<> pNmitte<l to mnke a claim for 
loss oceasimwd l>Y reason of flelaY. If the boar<l 
,,f c<hieation pos.scssPcl arhitran: power to sus-
pc·wl thr work of relator as it did for a period of 
~ y<>ni·s, it eonl<l exereise the sam0 power and con-
tinnr thr rxtensions for a period of 10 years 
witl1011t liahilit:· 011 tlw part of the hoard for the 
loss s11stainr<l howr,·er serious hy relator. 
Tt is i11<·011r·rirnlJle that the relator or thr board 
of rrl11r.·atio11 ronfemplaterl surh a construction of 
the r·o11fract as is hP.rr so11qht to be esta.blishrd. 
Tlwt the' hoarcl of c<lncation did not is demon-
strntr(l h:· its acts and drclared intention to deal 
fnirl:· <l1Hl jnstl:· with rrl!ttor, while at all times 
nrcsen·ing tl1r interests conficled to its rllargc. 
'tihe hoard arlrnowlc(lge<l an <lppreciation of the 
result of drla:· to relator during- a period nnparal-
lrlr(l in the histon· of the w0r1d, and which could 
not possihl>· l1e anticipated at the time the c.on-
trnct in question w:i.s rntered into. In the' ad-
111i11ist ratio11 nf ,i//sticf? the ro11rts 1cill e1:er care-
f 1111.11 sr· rn Ii 11 i ze r·mdraets 11'71 ieh b,11 their terms ar-
1· it raril.11 7ila1·e 01/1' part.If therrfo soleJ11 at thr 
1111,rr-11 nf the other JJarty to the insfr11mr11t, and i11 
flip i11ter1Jretatio11 of surh rontracts will ailort 
s11r11 co11strnrtio11 as 1rill br reasonable anil just. 
En·r:· rontrnct implirs good faith and fair clealing 
hdwN'll t lif> part irs to the same. Tlw contract in 
<111estio11, ('lan~c .T, docs not admit of a constrnc-
hon that tlw board of r<1ncation coulcl h:· the exer-
('i;;e of arhitrar» P°''·rr extend the time of relator's 
"·ork and (h•ln,· thl' samr for 3 Years or longer. 
Tl1r rlnrn;r• mn.st hr construed a~ inapplicable to 
dt•la>·s so grrat or so mirpas01iable that the:· ma:· 
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fairly be deemed equivalent to an abandonment 
of the contract and thus interpreted was not a 
bar to relator's claim. Johnson v. City of New 
York, 191 App. Div. 205, 181 N. Y. Supp. 137, af-
firmed 231 N. Y. 564, 132 :N.E. 890." (Emphasis 
added) 
The case of American Bridge Co111pa11y , .. State, 
283 N.Y. S. 577, (1935) was a case holding, in effert, 
that the "no damage" clause did not preclude reco\·-
ery by the contractor for delay caused by the State. 111 
the American Bridge case the plaintiff was reqnirrd 
to erect a super structure on a bridge at Poul{hkl'epsie, 
:New York, and because of the faulty construction of the 
sub-structure by another contractor the plaintiff was 
delayed 21 months in the performance of its contract. 
The contract between the plaintiff and the State con-
tained the following provision relating to delays: 
"It is anticipated that the main peers will lw 
sufficiently completed to permit the c>rectio11 of 
the towers to be started on the dates above given. 
In case of delay in such dates, the contractor will 
be giYen a corresponding extension of time in 
the dates of completion. It is expressly under-
stood and agreed that no claims shall he made 
against the State for any damage due tu delays i11 
the completion of the main peers U'hich are co11-
structed under another contract." (Emphasis 
added) 
It is interesting to note that in the American Rrirlge 
case the matter which caused the delay was actually ('Oll-
templated by the terms of the "no damage" clause. In 
the American Bridge case the plaintiff claimed tltat it 
was damaged because it was required by the State to 
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fahrieat0 tl1c steel super structure prior to the time it 
ronld he erected and that it suffered damage by virtue 
of th0 expens0 of storing the steel and the need to re-
p11int all of th0 steel prior to erection . 
. ~ werimn Bridge was treatt>d by the majority opin-
ion as one of active interference on the part of the State 
and took pains to say that tlw damage was not caused by 
the delay hut h~, actin' and unnecessary interference with 
tlH• rontractor. Howe\'er, the C1ourt also Raid" the whole 
co11trO\'crs~' centers around the construction to be given 
thl' q uotec1 portions of the rontract." (No damage clause 
qnote<l a hon>.) T n construing the "no damage" clause 
t11P Court said: 
"Tt iR douhtfnl, also, if the contract provisionR 
rrlating to <lelay apply to a delay of over 21 
months. Such clauses are usually considered inap-
plicable to delays so great or so unreasonable 
tlrnt they ma~' fairly be deemed the equivalent of 
an a bandonnw11t of tlw contract. ( Citing the "\Velis 
case) 
Tt is interesting- to note that even though the "no 
damage>" rlausc in the American Bridge case covered a 
sperifir t~'pe of dela~' encountered (which has been held 
to pr0clucl0 recon•ry) the clelay was so unr<>asonabl~' long-
tl1at it was \'iewe<l as not within the contemplation of the 
pn rti0s . 
. \ dissent rn thr A111crica11 RrirlgP case points out 
tl1nt then' was actuall~' i10 artiv<> i11terference l>y the> 
StcitP mHl tliat in 0ssence the contractor <'mbarked upon 
111(• m1timel~' fabrication of the steel at its own election. 
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Also the disse11ti11g op1111011 imlirntl·d tlwl tltPn• migl11 
haYe hcc11 delays for \Yhi<'h tli<' Statr c·oiild hml' h<'l'll 
liable hut that thr prllof of sn<'h damag<' was not pn•s\•11t. 
The easr of Rwlrcs Pl1111iln.J1.r; ('01'}J'1mtiu11 , .. ,'-,'fall', 
93 N.Y. S. 2d 574 (l~l50) was a easr in whid1 a plmnh-
ing contractor was ckniPcl rcco\·<'r)· for dl'lay lw('a\ls(• tl11· 
facts estahlishecl that the delay \n18 11ot <'a usPd hy 1111· 
defendant-~;tatc. Tl1P perti11ent 1iro,·isions wit It n•s]H'd 
to dcla)' \\'Pl'l' as follows: 
"If the contraetor iR dPlay<>d in tlH' c·ompl\•t ion 
of his work b~· any act or nrglP<·t of thl' Stat\• or 
by changes orderP(l i11 thP work or h)· all)' dausp 
which the rhicf l'llgim•ff shall dl'Pm to jnstif\ tlw 
cll•lay as lwing lwyoml tl1e eontraetor 's ('Ontrnl, 
then the time of cornplC'tio11 shall hp c·xtc•mll·d for 
such rcasonahle timP as tlu• <'hiPf Pngim'<'l' shall 
dl1<'ide. 
"No ehargr>s or <'laims for dnmagc•s shall 11,· 
matle by thr eo1itrndor for ;111)· dc•Ja:-·s or lii11-
<lnmces, from m1y c·anse \\'hatsoc\·<'r, llnri11,g 1!11· 
progrt>ss of all)' port ion of th<' work c·mhra<'e<l i11 
this eontraet. ~neh dc•lay 01· hi11drn11c·c•s shall lH' 
eompe11satell for hy m1 PXt<·11si011 of timt> as aho\·(' 
prO\·iclecl.'' 
L\..lth1ni.i.d1 th<:' Court in thl' R111lrf's ma1tPr disallow1•d 
the claim of thl' plaintiff it r<-<'ilt•d tl1L' l;m appli<·nlil1• to 
the cases with '' 110 clamagt•'' <'lausL's as iil<'l11di11g dc•la>' 
not contemplatL•d ll)' the• partiC's or <lc·lay for 1111n•aso11-
ahlc pL•rio<ls, at pagl' ;)7fi as follo\\'s: 
"The la\\' is, rath('l', tl1at th\•J"<• is 110 <111tonrntil' 
lial>ilit)·, hut that thL• Ntate ma>· lH·c·omc• lialil<' for 
ck lay wl1 C'I'l' it f uni isl1 c•s rn is l<•ad i 11g s p< 1 C'i fie-a 1io11;;, 
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1·1''1 u i l'l's or 1wrmi ts su hst an ti al changes in the 
.-..;pe('ifieatio11s or procedures, arbitrarily interferes 
,,·ith the progress of the work or unreasonably 
fails to progress it, takes some action not contem-
J!lrderl ln1 flu: J!arfies to the contract, or otherwise 
<ll-f i rely u r 111·,r1l i,r;rn fly ca11 se s an 1111reasonable de-
1a11, resulti11g i11 damage to the contractor." (Em-
phasis added) 
Nee• also ('111111i11glwJ11 Brothers, Inc .v. TVaterloo, 117 
X.\Y. '.!d +G. 
The f'asp of J>saty F. F1i71rrna11, lnl'. v. Housing .A11-
tl/()rit.11 of Prn rirleuce, 68 A. 2d ~2, 10 A.L.R. 2d 789 
( 1 !J-t!l) is often cited for the proposition that a "no <1am-
H!..(l''' clause• appli0s to 1mr0asonable delay because if it 
\\'NP otherwise the parties would have the responsibility 
ot' d<'tPrmi11i11g the reasonableness of drlays. However, 
in the J>saty case the contractor did not claim that delay 
''a" for a 11 1111 n•asonahle length of time, he claimed: 
"1-nd('r the t•xec•ption it (contractor) con-
krnls tliat it was entitled to recover damages for 
<1Pln>· <·ansP<l h» the arbitrary or unreasonable 
conduct of the nuthority." Page 795. (Emphasis 
afh1c•t1) 
Tl1e "no (lamage" clause in the Psaty case provided: 
"X o pa>·me11t or compensation of any kind 
shall he maclP to the coutractor for damages be-
<·ansP of hindrance or delay from any cause in 
the· progTc•ss of the ,,·ork, 1chctl1er such delays be 
11/'l!irlable r1r 1111arnidable." Page 795. (Empha-
sis adclPcl) 
The' contract prons1011 respecting extensions was 
11ot ,;pt forth nor considPrf'cl by the Court. 
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In holding that the (·011trnetor conld re(·on•r <ml>- for 
delay caused b~v had faith, frand, or malieions i11tt•nt, th<· 
Court in the I'saty case noted that use of the elansp 
"avoidable and mia\·oidahle" was: 
"To protect the anthorit>- in 1111 m1d0rtakill!~ 
of such magnitncle ngainst t ht> ,-exntions q1wstion. 
in perhaps irnrnmerahle i11cidents, whether any 
particular drla>- f'011hl hnve li0rn rensonnhl>- nn1id-
ec1 h>r th<> nnthorit~-." Page 7%. 
It is respectfully snbmitted that relieving thr ~tat" 
from the responsihilit>- to drt<>rmine r0asonahle lwha\·ior 
is an unsound principle of e011tnwt for parties are a hrn>·s 
obliged to conduct the performance of ('Ontracts in n rrn-
sonahle m~nmc>r and the detr>rmination of rraso11al1lrnrs" 
and reasonable time for performance is constantly 11<'-
fore the courts. :'.\foreon•r, in the ease at har, tlw Statf• 
of Utah affirmmatively acceptrcl th<> obligation to mnk<· 
R dPterminR ti on of reason a hle tinw in comwd i 011 wit 11 
the approval on the submission h>- tht> appr11ant nrnl a]c.;11 
with respPct to extensions for '' reasonn hle 1wrio(ls. · · 
Recent authority for tlw proposition that the appPl-
lant may reeo,·0r <lnmag-es for dc•la>- irrrspeetin' nf a "no 
damage" clause, is McGuire a11d Hester Y. City mul <101111-
ty of Sau Fran('isco, 247 P. 2<1 9:14, (1%2). Tn thf• ~k­
GuirP case the plaintiff contrnch•<l to co11strnet n wnt<•r 
fow hut was <kla>·Nl lwennse of tlw fnilnrP of thl' <l<'frll<l-
ant City to obtain righb-of-wa>- iirior to <'omm<'llf'<'TlWll1 
of the work. ''Ph0 '' 110 llamag<>'' clans0 proYi<l<•d: 
"A pnrt from [!,Ta11tin~ th<• (•0111 rneto1· <•>:t(•11-
sion of timf' for 1111m·oidahl<' (h•la~- (tltoc:c• li(J( 1111' 
fm1lt of thP l'Olltrndor) 110 Tl/l~'ll1!'1lt 01' ;i]]()\\:llli'I' 
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of any kind shall he madc to the contractor hy way 
of eompe11sation or damages on account of any 
l1i11<1rn11<'e or delay from any C'ause in the prog-
ress of the work or any portion thereof whether 
sneh de la>' lw avoidable or unavoidable." 
Tn addition to permitting the C'ontractor recovery 
for <le>lay the Mc0uire C'ase is important authority for the 
proposition that the failure of the contractor to quit the 
.ioh hecanse of dela>' \\·as not C'hargeable against him as 
<1 failnre to minimize damages caused by the City's 
lirrn<'h. 
The case of Trrmi11al Consfrudin11 Corporatirm v. 
!?1Trfe11 County H ackrnsack Ri1·er, S'anitary Seu·er Dis-
f ri"t A11fh11rity, 113 A. 2d 787 (N .• J. 1955), im'olv<>d C'On-
"tructio11 of a "no damage" clause. The Court held that 
-.;nch clauses are to be strictly construed against the 
drnftsmc'n, to wit: the own<>r. And held at page 795 as 
follows: 
"Construction of the contract is a question for 
the Court, except where the effect of a written in-
strument depends not merely on its construction 
and meaning hut upon disputed collateral facts 
in pais arnl rxtrinsie circumstances, the infer-
c•nces of fact to he drawn therefrom are for the 
jury's determination." 
The Trnninal Construction case, howe>ver, is impor-
tant authority for the proposition that fraud within the 
meaning of the rule with respect to "no damage" clauses 
whL•re an engineer is named as arbitrator urnler construc-
t ion contracts and his decisions are dispositive of disputes 
hetwce>11 the partie>s in absence of clear proof of fraud on 
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th<' part ot' the p11gi11re1· rnrnns more titan ordinm·~· fraud 
mid includes arhitrnry :wtion arnl gross rnistak<» At pagp 
799 the Conrt stated: 
"Frnml in thi;.: eo1111Pdio11 !ins a hron.lrr c·on-
notation tha11 is onli11nril:· irnpli<•<l. Tn :ulditin11, 
to its on1inar~- si~·11ifi.e,11H'(', in constr11<'tin11 c·on-
trndc: it i11cl11clP" :1rhitrnr:· ;1dion arnl gros,.; mis-
tnkc•. !1 Am . .Jnr. Bnilcling and Constrndio11 Ccn1-
tr:1cts, Rretion :q: nn(l H<';.:t:~trmPllt of tlw L;1\\· of 
C1011traets, R('ctiou :~0:1." ( ( 'iting· 11nmN011s au-
thorities.) 
Also nt page• 70!1, tliP Court said: 
"Tlw contractors emmot lw <lepriYr(l nf tl1rir 
ri.~·1its tltn'n~:h tl1P failtir(• nf tliP e11i.611PPr 1o :wt 
nor shonl<l the~- lw cldC'atc•rl h:- his frarnl or 
through his collusion .. ~ 1t1l 1/rnildless, ca11ririu11-
or arbitrar11 acfioil 011 71is 1iart 1rill bl' s11fjicif'11f 
nnon which to prediea tC' :1 fi11di11g of frnrnl." (Em 
plinsis adtkcl) 
The Terminal Co11sfr11ctio11 (·asp is also authority for 
the principle that the RtatP or ownrr is lia hlC' for s11Cli 
contlnrt of its engi1wrr-age11t, and that thP RtatC' is liahl(· 
for snc h constrnc·ti \'e fra nr l. 
The cast> of Ace 8to11e, lur» \'. Tra.111u· Tu1r11 ... ;J1i1J. :2:21 
A. 2d ;)J;) (~ .• T. .Jn]~-, 1~).);)), (le('i<krl ill .T nl:· of 1 !lfi(i, i" 
the most recent antl1ority app<•llant has hC'('ll nhlc to firnl. 
Also t110 ,ir'r' .C.,'trme easP is n rnth(•J' <•xlww-:1 i\·r· a11nl:·~i" 
of t11e east>s <1eali11g ,,-ith thr "110 danrngl'" ('];1us<' in 
0,uesti 011. 
Tn the• Arr' Sto111' <'Hsc• snmmnr~· .irnl.•.rnw11t 11:11111(·1·11 
grantPrl to tlw d!'fPrnlm1t-rro,.,usliip :111Cl (Ill npJH'<d tlw 
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matter \\'ilS n•\-c•rsed to Prntlile the parties to introclnce 
.-.:uC'h om! and doeumentcny e\·ide1H·e as \Yas availahle alHl 
relenrnt and i11 aicl of interpretation of the intention and 
c·ont<•mplatio11 of the parties to dc•termine \Yhether the 
la11.!.nrnge 11se<l in the "110 damage" clam;0 when consid-
(•n•<l in tlH• foll light of the relationship of the parties 
nll(l ohjc>cti,·es and attendant circumstances contemplated 
tltat the rxtP11si011 of time clause would preclude the 
plai11tiff from asserting damages for delay under the 
1·irc11msta11ees presenkd. 
In tl1is case thr plaintiff undertook to construct a 
-,('\Ye1· 1 ine project for the <lrfornlant, \Vayne Township, 
1111<1 eont<•mplatt'cl an 80-(la>- completion time. Because 
t li(• defoll(lant lwd iiot ncquin•<l all the 11ecessary rights-
nf-\\-a~- or rasements tlir Jllaintiff H"as 1111able to ('Ondurt 
ds ujJl'rafirn1s in a11 ordrrly, co11fi1111011s and rcn110111ica.l 
tnsl1iu11. \York stoppa,ges ensued hecause of the lack of 
c•;1seme11ts all(l the projeet had to be carried out in the 
"-inter months, lwing finall~- complete<l in June of 1962, 
wlw11 the original completion time would have been ap-
proximatl'l~- thl' mi<ltlll' of Novemlwr, 1961. 
Tl1C' rontrnet in ,lee Sto11e proYided that if the plain-
tiff '.ms dPht)'C'd in complC'tion of the work h>· an>· art or 
'l(·glvct of the Township or tl1e e11ginPer or 11~- strikes, 
\1·allrn11ts, etc., or li>· an~- ennsp lw~-ond the r01Iiraetor's 
1·011trol or hy a11>- cau:;;e which in tlH• opi11io11 of the e11gi-
lt<'l'l' justifies <lelay, then the rontraetor wou11l lw allowed 
<tddit iowil time to <'Ompletc) the work. In addition the 
<·ontraet eonb1inPcl a ''110 (lamng<)" clause in tlw fo1low-
i11 languagl': 
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"No rlaim for damag-(_'S or any rlaim othrr 
than for m1 pxtc11sion of time is herel1.'· pro,·iclecl 
shall he mack or assert(_>d against tlw owner hY 
reason of <~ela.'·s hereinheforp mentiorn>c1." . 
The Ne,,· Jersey Court said at page 517: 
"This type of exrnlriator.'· rln11se appears i11 
Yar.'·ing- phraseology in many reporte<l raRrs 
throughout thr rountr.\·. It is oftrn referrrc1 to 
as 'no d11mage' rlansr and though it is ge1wrally 
construed strictly against draftsmen (Cf. Trrmi-
nal Construction Corp. Y. Bergen County, etc .... 
113 A. 2d 787, 7%!"i) and sperial exceptionR an• 
often read into it, its nmlprlying leg·alit.'· is 
aclrnowledged.'' (Citing authorities) 
In connedion with thr exreptions to the "no dam-
age" clause the Court in Ace 8to11P, adopted and an-
proved the American Brirl_qe case, supra, PPOJJ!c v. Craiq. 
supra, and adopted nn earl.'· 100;) ease in P:i., 871ceh011 '" 
City of Pittsburgh, 62 A. 642, where th<' partirnlnr dela.'· 
hy the public hody was found to be "n kind not ro11trrn-
plated by the parties," and the Con rt said at pagr G1 i 
of the Atlantic Reporter: 
"The linr of <·nsPs repn•sc'nkd li.\· ~hc<•lian 
ma.'· wrl1 ha,·e pcrtiIH'lH'<' herr fo1· it inrlrnk-.; in-
stanrPs when• the exrnlpator.'· rlause is ronstnwd 
to he inapplirable t() a sihrntion whrn' n C'Oll-
tr:1dor prorer<1Nl rrnrsnnnt to tlir rrnhlic agenry's 
dirrction hut found that the "ite was not a\·ailalik 
to him beeansc~ of the agl'rn'.'·'s fnilnrP to l1n\·1· 
t!H' llC'eosRar." ri &?.'11h-of-wn~; or C'<1NC'mPnts.'' (Cit-
in~; easeN) 
In a<lOfJti11~ tlw prineipll' tlu1t tll<' ''11<1 <1;1m'1'2,·1,'' 
clanse m11R\ s11eeifk<lll.'· n•(·ifr c1t'lnYs \\'itl1i11 tl11· (·01tl1·m-
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platio11 of the parties (citing McGuire and Hester, supra, 
ns additional authority for such prinriple), the Conrt 
state•(} nt pagr :)1;) of thr A tlantir Rrportrr as follows: 
"Jt eam1ot he said tlrnt it was within the con-
templation of the partirs that the City 1.could be 
pern1itfed to delay the securing of rights-of-ioay 
for months thPrehy causing nlaintiff's expensive 
and heasy equipment to remain idle, finally caus-
ing- them to complrte the joh under extreme ad-
,·erse "·rathrr ronditions and thrn he relegated to 
an <'x!0l1Rion of time only If the City had such 
an intt•r1tio11 tlw contract should have so provided 
in explicit, mrnmhig-uous language. It is a funda-
me11tal rnle that stipulations a.gainst liahilit~r are 
not fanire(l and are to he strictly construed." 
(Citing authorities) (Emphasis added) 
In this connection thr Court cited Langevin v. Unit-
1'11 States, 100 C. Cls. 15 (1943) and Algernon Blair, Inc. 
,._ Norfolk Rederelopmeut and Housing Authority, 200 
\Ta. 81:5, 108 R.K 2d 259 (1959), as authority for the 
proposition that when the specific type of delay is not 
indicnted in the contract th<:> "no damage" clause is am-
liiguous and therefore must he interpreted in light of 
"·hat the parties contemplated and the construction 
plneed on the contract h~· the parties thrmsekes which is 
a question of fact for thr jury. 
rrhe Court in the Ace Stone case pointed out that 
the "110 damage" c1a use clearly contemplates that the 
C'011tractor himself will hear the risk of ordinary and 
usual t~·pes of dPlay in the progress and completion of 
the work, ancl that eYen in some eases the contractor 
will agn'c to hear the risk incide11t to high]~' crucial 
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d(' 1n:·:-; l'\'('ll tho:-;e rrlnting to t])(• ag<'rn·y 's failun· t11 
han· thr :-;ite rracl.'· for co11strnrtio11: ho\n•ver, i11 Slwh 
ea(':-; the eontrart shoul<l expn':-;s]y :-;o providP hrforp t lt(' 
contractor should he ohlige<1 to acerpt s11Ph exh'(•nw and 
crneial risks of (lelay. 111 addition, the Courts statrtl tlrnt 
parol evidence concrrning the cnstom in tlw tradr ma~· lw 
introducc(l to shcd light upon whether the parties nt·-
tual1:;· coutemplate(l h.'· the "110 damage" clause risk of 
clelay of the kind iiffolwcl in the partienlar casu and 
statcd at page 520 as fo1lo\\'S: 
"The admitted goal is to asrrrtain and pffc'<'-
tnate the contemplati(\11 arn1 common intrntion of 
the parties." 
'ro this <late the Utah Supreme Conrt has not c1P-
ci<1ed the pr0cise "no damage" qnestion before the Conrt 
in this mattel'. In R11ssell v. Bot711cell & 81Mner Co111-
pa11y, l'f al., nt 57 U. 3G2, Hl4- P. 110!) (1920), the plaintiff 
was to do tl1e l·arpenhy work in connection with con-
struction of a homc for defendant and was delayr<l ill 
performance by the defendant for an aggregatc of :;0 
days. It also appears that the plaintiff terminated it:-; 
work without completing the joh. The delays 'Ser<> orrn-
sioned hy rhe defendant's failure to furnish material nllll 
to haYe other work done on the lrni1<1i11g neress1:ll'_\. for 
the plaintiff to pror<>ecl with his work. There wa:-; llO 
ll rovision in the eon tract lwtwccn the pa rtics sti pnla ti w.!,· 
a time witlii11 whiel1 the carpe11try work was to 1w C'Oll1-
plete<1 h:· the plaintiff. T11e pan1gTapl1 of tlie rontr<id 
prrtinent to <lPla:~ \Yas as follmn:: 
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'' ~110111(1 t 11<> ('(mtraet ur he delc1n•<1 i11 the> eorn-
pl(•t ion 01· prnsl'l'.uti011 of tlH• wo.rk h~· tl1t• ad, 
Jl('!!,'lt•d 01· ddault of t ltc• mn1l'r or lrv any dama"<' 
• • M 
cm1sed 1>~> fin\ or other <'asn:dtv for which the 
eo11tnwtor is not n•sponsihlt> or 1°>y genera1 strike 
or \\;ilk-out <·<111sc•d hy acts of emplc>~·ees and he-
yornl the co11trnl of the eontrador, then the> time 
li<•rein spe>l'ifiit·d for the· t•mnpletion of the ·work 
ma.v lie exicndec1 for n pvriod equirnlent to the 
t inw lost 11~· renson of any or all of the causes 
afore>said, provided a clai~ for suC'h allowance> is 
pn•s<•uted in \\Tit ing to tlie owner within 48 hon rs 
after tli<> occmTencc of such t1elay, and provided 
sn('h allowance is c1eterminec1 hy agrecment in 
\~Titimi,· (If tlw parties hereto." 
In <1e11yi11g the plaintiff any relief for delay caused 
h.,. (1cfondant, the Court ohRerved that the dela~· \\·as not 
tlw re::rnlt of fraudulent, malicious or unreasonable acts 
or conduct 011 the part of the defendant to delay or harass 
thr plaintiff in the proseeution of the work and that 011 
tl1<' eo11tn117 the evidence showed that the defendant hacl 
m1 rnnwst desire to proceed with the 1vork with all rea-
:-;01rnhle dispatch. Certainly then" 1rns no evidencr of un-
n·asonable delay iu the Russell case and the Court ack-
nowledged the importaitce of what the parties contem-
plated at time of execution of thr agreement by acloptin!; 
I lie principleR announced in Goss v. Northern Paci/it Hos-
}Jital Association of Tacmna, 50 ·w a. 238, 96 P. 1079, 
\\'l1err the Court stated that when parties to a e011trad 
foresee the possibility of delay and provide therefor 
11~, extensions of time it is to he presumed that the parties 
intc•]](lPd such prescribed reme<l:· as tlw sole remedy for 
"11d1 clc>by wherr there is nothing in the contract itself 
1ir in the eornlitions surrounding its l'xecution that 11e-
<'<'sRiiates a different conelusion. 
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It is respectfully ~rnlnnittt>d that tlie R11sscff ('HS(' j, 
not in conflict with the Ace 8to11p <'Hse and the principle's 
announced therein with respeet to ascertai11ing tlw con-
templation and inknt of the parties to the eontract nor 
in conflict with the Brady and Peovle v. f!raig decisions 
with respect to the unreasonahle length of delays. 
The case of Campbdl Building rmnpany v. 8tatr 
Road Cornmission, 95 U. 242, 70 P. 2d 857, (1937), was 
an action by a road contractor against the State of Utah. 
arising out of the construction of 15 miles of State hii~·li 
way South of Kanosh, Utah. ThP work C'Ommenced 011 
September 11, 1932 and was completed in the spriHg 
of 1933. 
The Campbdl case was one essentially involving-
claims for extra work; however one of the causes of 
action contained general allegations of delay caused hy 
the State of Utah, based upon malice and intent to put 
the plaintiff out of hnsiness. The evidPnce (lid not eRtnh-
lish any such malice and intent nor dof's it appear that 
there was an.'· evidence of nnreasonahle dela.'·· rrhf' co11-
tractor was denied rPeover.'· for delay and it is sig-nificant 
to notf' that the casf' does not renlly han' an.'·thing to <lo 
with dela,\·s of nnreasonahh, l1nrntion 11or is it co11crrn0t1 
with interpretati011 of an,\· rlnnsf' p11rportlng to cover 
the problem of thf' <l<:>l<l.''· The caRr lrns 110 <>xprrssi011 
nf' }pg·a1 prineiplP control1ing· i11 thf' C<1C'f' at har. 
IllnRtrati,·f' of the natnn• of <1nmag-L'S rPco\·C'rahl(' 
for df'la,\· iR LaJ1.flr'/'i11 \'. rT11ife17 States, 100 ('1. Cl. 1~) 
(104:-n, wli<:>r" the Court liel<l that th<> coJ1trnetor <'onld 
]'('('()"\'('}' : 
·' ( 1) Cost of superintendence and job overhead. 
(2) Equipment rentals. 
( 3) Increased price of materials. 
( 4) Loss of discounts for prompt payment of 
bills. 
( 5) J1Jxtra cost of doing certain work. 
( 6) Additional travel expense." 
POINT III 
'fHE STATE OF UTAH IS LIABLE FOR IN-
TEREST ON ANY AMOUNT FOUND DUE 
APPELLANT. 
Appellants concede the fundamental principle to 
the effect that the state being sovereign is under no 
legal obligation to pay interest on any claim against it 
1mle8s it becomes so liable through statutory provision 
or express agreement. See Sedgwick on Damages, Vol. 
I, ~ 338a (9 ed.) 
Research has failed to reveal any case dealing spe-
cifically with whether in Utah the State is liable for the 
payment of interest on damages occasioned through 
breach of contract. However, Auerbach v. Salt Lake 
County, 23 U. 103, 63 P. 907 (1900) is a case in which 
this Court assessed interest against the county. There 
the county selectmen entered into fraudulent contracts 
for the purchase of furniture with one Andrews & Com-
pany, who subsequently by county action received a 
$15,000.00 warrant which was thereafter purchased at 
diseount by the plaintiff. It is not clear from the report 
whether the warrant was interest bearing. The county 
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r<•l'11.-.;p<[ to p11)· t11c· wanant on th<· !..('1·01rn<1 tl1at 1l1<· (·011 
t rn<'ts wL•n• fraw1nh·11t arnl therrfon· \·oirl. \Y11ile it is 
llOt <•1itircly fr<><~ ()f douht thr> <·onrt in holdi11l! for t] 11 . 
plaintiff Sl'L'ms to lwY<> deeifl<,<1 the c·as0 npon <lll im1ilil·il 
C'ontrn('hrn1 hasis. At page 11 (i of tl1e rq>ort it "ta ti·": 
"\Vliethr>r this aetion of tl1i• c·<1rn1t)· <·onrt (Rc·sr>lutio11 1i1· 
.Jnnr El, 1804) arn1 the tomp1im1c·e t11erl'\\·itl1 ll;· ,\lllln·\1·.; 
& Company er0n t <'< 1 a \·al i<l ton t ra('t, anrl whet her it 
nnthorizc(l the issnarn·p of the warrant or \dwther the 
warrant issnecl in pursnanec therr•of is ahsolntc>l.\· n1iil. 
are cinrstions whieh, from the ,·ie\Y WP han· takr·11 
of the ease, we do not (leem imyrnrta11t or nc•r·r,;;s~n\ 
to dcei<lc.'' 'The con rt then goes 011 to eite witl1 apJH'OY<l l 
Argenti Y. City of San Frnnr·isc·o, 1G Ca1. 2:)G a11rl ~\!•" 
Jm;tirc Fiek1, who in a com·nrri11'.o!· ovi11i<m ,.tat<·": "11° 
the city obtain the money of another hy mistake. or \YitJi. 
out antborit;· of law, it is her duty to refuncl it - not 
from nny contract enten,rl into h:· ber on the snl1,jr('t. 
hut from the g-Pnernl ohligation to 1111 jnstir·c, whiC'h l1iw~" 
all persons, whether natnra1 or artificial. If the C'it: 
ohtaill otlH~·r pro1lerty \\·hich cloes not l1elo11Q' to lwr. i! i" 
her dnt)· to restore it: or if nsecl 11)· her. to rPrnlcr rn1 
eqni,·aknt to the true 01nier. from thr 1ike ~:·c·nHnJ nh1i· 
g-ation. In these cases slw cloPs 110t. in fact. rnak•· ;rn1· 
promise 011 the snhjC'et. lrnt the lnw. v:hich ah a;·s i11tt•:ttl" 
justieL', implies om•: and l1cr linliild11 th11.<: ori.'ill(T i.' .~0: 1 1 
to l; r a l i al; i 1 it ,11 o 11 a 11 i 111 p 1i1r7 r n 11 t ra r +. . . . .. ( En~ Jl h n "'i" 
snpplic(l) 
1f tlw runrt (1t>ciclec1 ~\nerl1ach on imp1ie1l i11 bw 
pri1wiples. t11t•11 ~\11er;1;1ch i.' nn:bwit:· fnr tliP 11r11pn,.,i· 
tio11 that in Ptnh i11terest i-. 1 iro1wrlY <1W<ll\1L•,[ :111 cl;1illl" 
I ' • 
<1.~·ni11st a puhli<' corporation m1l<>ss then• is n11 express 
ctgl'l'l'm<·1tt to tl1<• co11tra1·y since the C'Onrt in deciding 
T ]J(' (';Ji.;(' Jooke>d Jlt•ither to th fl terms of the .J lllle rn, l'('S-
u]ution or tlie wanm1t. 
Haker T,11111l;er ComJWAnJ \'. A. A. ('lark ('01117)(]11.1;, 
el al. (Bo;udman Intervenor, ;)3 U. 336) (1919) is <ilso in-
_-,( ructivP. In that case Baker brought a11 action as a 
nrnterialman pursuant to Comp. Laws Utah 1907, ~ J400X 
\Yl1ich provided for the maintenance of a suit by a mate-
rialman against any public corporation for an amount 
not to exceed that ff\ve<l the principle contractor hy the 
pnhlic corporation. The School District contern1ed it "'as 
not honnd to pay interest on issued warrants, that there 
was no exrll'esR provision in the statutes authorizing pnh-
lic corporations to issue interest bearing warrants aucl 
tliat the great weight of authority is that warrants 
~Jioulcl uot be eonstrued to hear interest absent some con-
t rn r~· statutory provision. The court rejects this agree-
ment and cites Comp. Laws Utah 1907, ~ 1241 respecting 
tl1<1 rate of interest as follows: 
"The legal rate of interest upon the loan or 
forebearance of any money, goods, or things in 
action shall he eight per cent. per annum. But 
nothing herein contained shall be so construed so 
as to in any ·way affect any contract or obliga-
tion made before the taking effect of this title." 
.:\fr. Justice Gideon then states: 
·we are nnable to understand why a public 
corporation should not be reriuired to meet its ob-
lihations the same as any other body authorized 
to contract debts, ancl upon a failure to make pay-
ment at the time agreed why it should not he re-
qnired to pay interest for any forbearance as an 
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indi,·idunl. ~lorf'r 1 \·f'r, tlii:-: <·ourt has n•(·og1ii:.wd 
11rnt a p11hli<' rornoration, \dJf'l'P it hnd rPee>in'<l 
the lwndit of goocls, :o;houM pn~; thP legal rat<' 
from tlH' <lntP it l'P<'('in'<l the hP11Pfit of its ro1i-
trad. Anerharh ,-. R;11t LakP Cit>·· 2:1 Utah 10:1. 
G8 Par. 907, 90 Am. St. R<•pt. 68;). Tt if.> not a que>s-
ti<1n of tl1P sehool hon r<l ngreeing to pa>· i11tPr0f.>t 
rither hy warrant or otlwrwisP. lt is a qne>stion 
of its clnt>- on onr sidP nn<l the right of the <'re<li-
tor on the other. 1t is n right that the statnt<• 
gin•s to mi>- 01w ,,-ho haR money due and who is 
miahJe> to <'OllP<'t thC' Rame. rrhC' srhooJ hoanl in 
this <'asr accepted the lrnildi1ig. Presnmabl>- it 
had the URE' of it for the pnrpos0 for whieh it was 
rr1>ctec1 and has eo11tinnPcl to nse it since its ae-
rPptanee. Puhlie polir>·, it seems to us, shonld 
require a pnhlie <'Orporation to meet its obliga-
tions lPgally 1rnthorizPcl whe>never dne, and npo11 
failure to clo so that it he subjected to the same> 
dut>· as private individuals - to reimburse> tlw 
rreflitor for l1is forl10ara11r0 or clelay· in rr<"ciY-
ing \Yhnt is his due.'' 
Baker is signifirmit too, lweanse tlH' court impliedly 
eonstrnes Comp. Laws Utah Hl07 arnl l 400X to rn<><rn 
that when the sovereign snl1mits itself to snit, unlrss tlw 
statutP speeifirall>- Jffovides otherwise>, it shonld elltrr 
court on tlH' samP hasis as any private irnliYiclnal. Thi,; 
ronstrnrtion of the> court's opinion is manifc.st h:- tl•P 
1angnage HhO\-C' quotea. Fnrtlwr, tlw conrt intrrpr<'1~ <l 
general intcre>st statute, Comp. LmYs Ftah 1!107 ·' 1:2+1. 
so as to appl:· to public corporations in adc1itio11 1-n pri-
vatr individuals. 
:\fore>OYl'l', Ill Fell \'. r~11i1111 Po(·ifi1· R11ifrna1/ ('(/ .. :i:! 
F. 101 (1007) this ronrt liel<l tli<' Lid tlrnt <1: 1 ~11;1···1·-
3-t 
<tl'l' rniliquidate<l is not of itself n•aso11 for r0fnsi11g in-
terest. \Vhile Fell dealt with damages for injury to 
livestork sustai11ed through defendant's 11eglige11re it was 
cited as authority in Biugliam C. & L. eo., et al. v. Board 
of Rr711catiot1 of Jordan School District of Salt Lake 
('ounty, 61 U. 149, a case involving alleged breach of 
<'<rntract, for the basic principle that interest will be 
allowed from the time of injury or destruction provided 
the injury and ronsequent damages are complete as of 
a particular time. 
Under ~27-12-9 U tab Code Annotated the legislature 
has provided that "By its name the commission may sue 
and be sued only on written contracts made by it or under 
its authority," thereby recognizing sound public policy 
dictates the 8tate assume responsibility for its legally au-
thorized obligations. The legislature by this statute mm;t 
hC' deemed to have intended to provide an enforreable 
remedy for those often hapless plaintiffs who find 
themselves remediless because of the virtually unassail-
a hle sovereign immunity doctrine. 
Through the above quoted statutory prons10n, the 
State impliedly consented for purposes of suits on writ-
ten co11tracts, to stand as any other litigant, liable for 
<'ORts and interest. When the sovereign consents to suit 
it ought not to be givei1 an unfair advantage he~'ond that 
"-hieh i8 accorded any other party in similar circum-
stances unless the clear language of the statute provides. 
There is no such clear language in ~27-12-9. Moreover, 
.-.;urh construction of ~27-12-9 is consistent with the stat-
utory ronstruction in Baker v. Clark supra. 
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Tu,ar11rn.1; , .. Terrell. lJ/ Fl<1. 8:18, 1."">8 So. :i12 (1!1'.).->) 
is fndnall:· similar to th0 instant ras0 nrn1 snpports th<' 
stn tu ton· ronstrnrt ion sought for \ 27 -12-0. Th C' C'<l s0 in-
YolHd a W'rit of Prohibition 11ronght l)y tlw State to n•-
strnin the Board of Arbitration from 011kri11g an award 
for i11tl'l'CSt UlH1C'l' a statr statntP \\·Jiirh fffO\'ided for HC'-
tions agai11st th0 stat0 road d0partment to enforc0 rlaims 
arising mH1e>r contnids for Jallor alHl mat0rials. TlH· 
(\lllrt rdusc'd to interfrr 011 th<> basic gT(1111H1 that a claim 
for intr>rest is a legal i11rid0nt of a claim against tlH· 
:.:tate. Sn id tl10 ronrt: 
"The statntP a11tl1ori1~Ps snits ngainst th<' 
statP roa<l dPpartm0111 on an>· elnim arising nrnl<•r 
contra et for work done since .T n11e, 1 !l2~, and tlH· 
('OJ1traets for tl1r> rnnd aw1 bri(h?:e ronstrndion 
\\·hicli thP rnnd de>mntmPnt ic; antl10rized to makt· 
ma:· lw of snch a natme that the pa~·ment of 
intc•rpc;t on amounts chw nml unpaid h~· thP stat" 
mn:· hP 1wrt>ssa1T to dri eomnlrte ;jnsticP lwtw0011 
thP parties: aml. in tlie abseur·r of a co1drari1 
sfut11for11 i11te11t. it ma.11 be ass111111·r1 tliat, i11 
011t7/l)rizii1.a suits a,aai11st the state roarl rlqwrf-
11u·1d. t11e state intend.<! that intrrest may be arl-
.f1ulprd against thr state in /)roper casrs 11'l1ere 
it is 1H'crssan; to do complete _justice allrl to or-
('0111 /Jlish the JJllrJJOsrs of the statute in r111t11or-
izi11.a s11its aqai11st th(' state . .. " (Bmplrnsi,; 
added) 
Arconl: rhalrlron "· Statr. 214 N.V{. 297 
Tl! (Yhica.ao, St. Pa11l Minn. if Ohio Railroad Com-
pan1; , .. Jfondt. ru1111t.11 Treas11rrr, ;)6 S :D .")~0. 229 X.\\'. 
:104 (19~0) thr plaiutiff paid taxes lmde>r prote>st ;111il 
l:ro11glit 011 ;1e1io11 1111d0r a statntr which grnntrd tc ;111\· 
person \\·ho p<1id tnxrs m1dPr protest 11H· 1·i! . ..;l1t to < 11111-
rn<•nre aetio11 for the reco\'1_•ry thereof. The statute in 
qm~stion like the one in Treadway supra, made no pro-
\'ision for iHterest. 
The Supreme Court of South Dakota re\'Prsed the 
lowt•r court's derision which had disallowed interest 
saymg: 
''It seems to us the fair, just, and reasonable 
rnle that when the sovereign submits itself to 
snit, nn less the statute expressly provides to the 
eontrar.\', it should come into court on the same 
hm,is ns to liability for interests and costs, in the 
en•nt of adverse decision, as any other suitor." 
1t is respectfully submitted that ~27-12-9 U. C. A. 
\\-he11 viewed in light of the cited Utah cases and other 
authority should be constrnecl to insure complete com-
pcHsation which includes interest to the appellants should 
they prove successful at bar. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The history of the cases construing the "no dam-
age'' clause aHd the recent interpretations thereof as 
illustrated hy the Ace State case, clearly show that, in 
addition to relief granted for fraud or ba(l faith, such 
c·lauscs will not be enforced where the delay is not con-
iemplatecl by the parties inrlucling delays so unreason-
ably ](mg as to justify the contractor in abandoning the 
emitrart though not requiring him to do so. 
In the case at bar, the essence of what the parties 
vontcmplated is found in the stipulation that perform-
a11vp would be completed in nine months by approxi-
mately November 3, 1958. A factor contributing to this 
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understanding was the condition rxpressecl in appellants 
proposal that plans and designs "·ere to be approved ll\ 
the respondent within two weeks of submittal. Correlafo.'p 
to this was the contract provision that c1efornlant would 
approve such plans and designs within a reasonable time. 
The parties contemplated and stirmlated that rwr-
formance wonld be accomplished ·within nine month:-; 
because it "·as a crash program ::wcelerated to take ad-
Yantage of construction funds from the Federal Govern-
ment. There was no circumstancr suggesting to eitlwr 
party that the work wonld be delayed berause of irnmf-
ficient funds. The contract specifirally provided thnt 
such funds had been budgeted. 
Nothing in the contract nor during· the period of 
negotiation suggests that the respondent would fail to 
secure permission to enter railroad propert)• until thr 
end of .July, 1958, to conduct drilling operations for 
sub-surface soil teists or suggests that the railroad 
clearances for structures would be delayed for twelw 
months until March of 1959, or suggest that the respond-
ent would delay approval of plans and designs suhmittrd 
by appellant for periods ranging· from thirteen weeks to 
fifty weeks, or suggests that the defendant would take 
two months to partiall)· approve the preliminary plan 
aml design submitted hy plaintiff, or sng-gest that the 
resrJondent 's staff was so inadequate as to hr unable 
L 
to process the plans and desigJ1s submitted, or suggest 
that after appellant's intensiYe and extensive perform-
ance in earl)· 1958 that clecelerntion would extrrnl the 
work required of plaintiff until Oetoher, 1961. 
38 
The appellant furnished its preliminary design 
within the time contemplated by the contract, but two 
mo11ths expired hefore the State approved the same in 
pa rt. Certainly the parties could not have contemplated 
tliis t,Ype of delay and yet anticipated completion of the 
eontract within uine months . 
.\Ieasured by the 1li1le mouths contract time the de-
lays <'aused by the respondent were for such duration 
as to imply and strongly suggest that such delays were 
:ubitrary, unreasonable and without the proper regard 
for appellant under circumstances ':r here respondent 
had full knowledge of plaintiff's position, knew appel-
lant proposed that its submissions be approved within 
two-weeks, failed to take any satisfactory steps to rem-
r'<ly the inahility of the State to process the plans sub-
mitted, knew or should have known that an extremely 
rnJarged staff was marshalled by the appellant to ac-
eomplish a crash program and would necessarily be re-
quired to stand idle if the plans and designs were not 
processed within a reasonable time. 
The contract reflects that the parties contemplated 
no more than ordinary and reasonable delay. Under the 
circumstances, perhaps even a delay of four weeks in 
appnwing the plans and designs would have been reason-
able although would naturally have extended the com-
pletion time beyond the nine month targ~t date. How-
l'Yer, the nine month completion date is the outer limit 
h~, which reasonableness was to be measured. Had the 
~rparate incidence of delay not been so extensive per-
haps the parties could be said to have contemplated even 
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some d0grec of 11111·easo1rnhk~ de la:-. "Within t lw frnmc•-
work of the circnmsbrnees here, ho-\Ye,·e1', common sells<' 
sugg0sts, and there is 110 c·,-i<lenee otlwrwise, tlrnt tliP 
parties did not eo11t0mplatc- that m1n•nsorn1 hie dela:-s in 
the composite would 0:xt0ncl on•r a period of thirt)--four 
months, as a resu1t n0cesc:a ril)- follcrwing from tlw i11ter-
relatio11sl1ip of tlw phases of tlw work pPrfonrn•d. 
Um1cr th0 circnmstane0s nppellant wonld lrnve h0t>11 
justified in abandoning th0 eontrnet !mt it di<l not. 
Reconstruction ancl re,'it'"\'' of tlw performnnre of 
this rontrnet hy the respondent forrefnll)- sng·gests tlrnt 
its arhitrary and unreasonnhle disrrganl of apywllant 's 
position results from the State> 's posture ·with the United 
~Hates Bureau of Public Roads. The respomlcnt, Stab-.• 
Road Commission, obviously thought of itself as a men• 
passive instrument of the Bureau of Public Roads. rrhc 
rt>spomlent simp1)- faikd to exercise good faith and 
affirmatiYCl)- p0rform its contract with the appellant. 
exp0rting alwa)'S to hlame thr Burean of Pnhlic Roads 
for the resp(mdent 's o-wn hreach of c011trart and lack 
of good faith and at the same time expecting tlw Bureau 
of Public Roads to pay the hill. The respondent ·wants 
the 11C•st of nll possih1e worlds. Berm1se it in its clefm11t, 
wanfa thr Bureau of Pnhlie Roads to call the tmw the 
appellant shonlfl not hr rC'qnin•d to (la11e0 to the music. 
Appellnut cli<l not co11hact with the Bnrean of Pnlllic 
Roach::. 
It is resp0ctfull)' suhmittell the District Comt c•ned 
rn granting summan- jrnlg-me11t to Ddernlnnt for 111(• 
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follo"·in~ reasons: (1) There was and is a factual ques-
tion regarding the parties contemplation with respect to 
tlw "110 damage" proviso; (2) an exculpatory clause i8 
ll~lt in every instanee properly e0118trued to deny reeov-
NY for damages but must he eonstrued in light of rea-
son and eireumstance. Moreover, 8ince the State under 
'~· 27-12-9 U.C.A. has wai1,·ed its immunity from suit, the 
State should be held, in fairness and justice, to have 
effeeted a total waiver and therefore liable for interest 
on elaims properly brought again8t it. 
ALLAN E. MECHAM, ESQ., 
GEORGE M. I\IECHAM, ESQ., 
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Avpellants 
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